

Embodied Simulation, Phenomenology and The Concept of Empathy

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to conduct a critical assessment of the alleged compatibility between the account of empathy that Vittorio Gallese presents in his embodied simulation theory and Edmund Husserl's phenomenological account. That is, I will develop and critically assess Gallese's claim that an account of empathy, based on mirror matching mechanisms, is compatible with a Husserlian phenomenological account of empathy. More specifically, I will be querying whether a theory like Gallese's embodied simulation theory, that relies upon simulation and projection, is capable of accounting for the important aspect of *mutual transfer of sense*, which I take to play a pivotal role in Husserl's account of empathy. Finally, I will briefly discuss whether Husserl's own account of empathy really is that well equipped to account for the difference and transcendence of the Other that challenges the embodied simulation theory.

Introduction

The aim of this article is to assess whether the account of empathy presented within Gallese's embodied simulation theory and Husserl's phenomenological account of empathy are compatible. On the basis of an exposition of Gallese's embodied simulation theory, according to which mirror matching mechanisms are the ground for direct experience of the Other, and the phenomenological approach of Husserl, I wish to present an argument that questions the compatibility between embodied simulation

and phenomenology. The motivation behind this interpretative discussion is Gallese's claim that these two approaches to the notion of empathy are compatible. Thus, a more general motivation behind this article is to contribute to the discussion of the relation between neurobiology and phenomenology with regard to empathy.

More specifically; by focusing on Husserl's emphasis on the alterity of the Other and the way in which this otherness is experienced through empathy, I question whether Gallese's theory of embodied simulation is capable of accounting for this (in the phenomenological tradition) important aspect of intersubjective relations. In this respect, I will draw on Zahavi's interpretation of Husserl's notion of empathy.

In continuation of this critical assessment, I also want to question how a theory like Gallese's, that relies upon simulation and projection, is capable of accounting for the important aspect of mutual transfer of sense, which I take to play a pivotal role in Husserl's account of empathy. That is, I take the alterity of the Other to be intertwined with, and play an important role in, the mutual transfer of meaning that affects one's own self-experience.

Finally, I will briefly discuss whether Husserl's own account of empathy really can account for the difference and transcendence of the Other. I believe his theory bears merits in this regard based on some of his transcendental considerations about the possibility of experiencing the Other as truly Other. Firstly, however, I will briefly clarify the concept of mirror-neurons.

Clarification of Concepts: Mirror-neurons

In order to prepare the forthcoming argumentation, I wish to briefly clarify the concept of mirror-neurons, as well as why they are of importance for the discussion of how we experience Others.

Mirror-neurons are considered a class of visuomotor neurons which were originally observed in macaque monkeys. These neurons discharge

when the monkey observes an action made by another individual, or when it executes the same or a similar kind of action itself. Empirical evidence suggests that a similar mirror matching system also exists in humans (Gallese 2003b: 173 f.). When human beings perceive a given action of another individual, the same motor circuits that are recruited when we perform the same action ourselves are concurrently activated. In other words, whenever we perceive the actions of another individual it seems as if we are internally simulating it (ibid., 174 f.). As Gallese puts it: “Although we do not overtly reproduce the observed action, our motor system becomes nevertheless active *as if* we were executing that very same action that we are observing.” (ibid., 174).

This mirror matching neural mechanism is of pertinence for the discussion of how we experience others given the fact that it, for some theorists, is considered the underlying function of, or the precursor for, mind-reading processes, i.e., the processes involved in representing the mental states of others (Gallese & Goldman 1998: 495).

Gallese: Embodied Simulation, Empathy, and Phenomenology

In the following section, I wish to unfold Gallese’s theory of embodied simulation, the respective account of empathy, and the way in which Gallese takes this to be in accordance with phenomenology. As will become evident later, I consider this supposed compatibility between the notion of empathy, as presented by the embodied simulation view and phenomenology, respectively, to be questionable.

Gallese suggests that a common functional mechanism is at the basis of our basic forms of social understanding, namely what he terms *embodied simulation* (Gallese 2005: 23).²⁹ This basic functional mechanism allows us to achieve an experiential insight into other minds. Therefore, what we need

²⁹ Not exclusively, cf. Gallese 2006

to investigate, according to Gallese, is the neural correlate(s) of this capacity to understand other minds. He takes this to be the above-mentioned mirror neuron mechanisms (Gallese 2006: 8).

Accordingly, when I perceive an action performed by the Other, say grabbing a cup of coffee, this also involves me internally simulating it as if I was performing the grabbing of the coffee cup myself (cf. the above section on mirror neurons in general). More specifically, my ability to understand the action of the Other relies on a basic functional mechanism by way of an embodied, internal, i.e. not overtly reproduced, simulation of the grabbing of the coffee and the underpinnings of this simulation are the mirror neuron mechanisms. This further means that the embodied simulation is taking place at a sub-personal level. The internal simulation is an implicit, automatic, and unconscious process (Gallese, 2003b: 174). Gallese further hypothesizes that this functional mechanism is not only at work in terms of action understanding, but rather encompasses all kinds of interpersonal understanding. In other words, it is not only action understanding but also the attribution of intentions to the Other and the ability to recognize emotions and sensations that depend upon this pre-reflexive embodied simulation (ibid., 177/Gallese 2006: 8).

Consequently, Gallese posits that we share a multiplicity of mental states with the Other, on account of mirror matching mechanisms in our brains that internally represent the body states of the Other associated with his or her actions, emotions, and sensations. They do so in such a manner that it seems as if we were performing a similar action ourselves but in an automatic and non-inferential way (Gallese 2003b, 171 ff./Zahavi 2012: 220). Gallese, therefore, characterizes empathy as a direct experience of the Other that is not dependent upon cognitive operations, but rather is to be understood as a form of pre-reflexive simulation (Gallese 2003a: 519 ff.). In other words, my emphatic experience of the Other relies upon a shared manifold of states that in turn depend upon mirror matching mechanisms

in the brain (i.e. mirror neurons). Further, the type of simulation that Gallese is writing about is to be understood as a form of reuse. That is, we are reusing a brain process in order to generate knowledge about that process, and it is due to the mirror neurons reuse of processes that we can have, or obtain, a direct understanding of the Other's actions, emotions, and sensations (Gallese 2011: 46). The question then is, how does this relate to phenomenology?

Firstly, Gallese is directly expressing the view that they are similar to each other: "The mechanism of action understanding, based on the mirror neuron mechanism, is conceptually similar to the proposal for how action understanding takes place according to phenomenologists [...]" (Gallese et al. 2004: 397). Secondly, and as we have seen, Gallese considers the experience of the Other to be direct in nature (whether this is in fact plausible on this account will be questioned later). In other words, the notion of empathy, according to the embodied simulation theory, supposedly involves a direct experiential understanding of the Other. On the face of it, this seems to be in accordance with the phenomenological approach, as e.g. presented by Husserl according to which empathic understanding of the Other is immediate and direct (Zahavi 2014: 125 ff.). Thirdly, Gallese seems to stress the importance of the body and the role of *intercorporeity* in any intersubjective relation (Gallese 2011: 39): "It is the sharing of the same situatedness and the sharing of the same intentional goals that makes intercorporeity a privileged access to the world of the other" (ibid., 39). Besides the direct reference to Merleau-Ponty, the role of the body in intersubjective relations is also a key notion within the phenomenological approach.

The Phenomenological Approach to Empathy: Husserl's account

In what follows, I will attempt to outline a phenomenological approach to the notion of empathy and, in particular, one interpretation of Husserl's

notion of empathy that complicates the supposed accordance with embodied simulation. I first want to briefly mention that the concept of empathy is an ambiguous term, in the sense that there does not seem to be a general consensus about what the term denotes (Zahavi 2014: 146). Further, following Zahavi, when I am speaking of a phenomenological approach to the concept of empathy, this is not meant to imply that philosophers such as Stein, Scheler, and Husserl (to name a few) agree on everything regarding the concept of empathy (ibid.: 150). However, in the forthcoming exposition, I will briefly present some of the things that are shared within the phenomenological tradition.

One of the things that the phenomenologists agree on, is the rejection of any account of empathy, according to which it is considered to be a simulation-plus-projection routine. In other words, they reject any account of empathy where it is conceived of as a projection of one's own mental states onto or into the Other (ibid., 150). Further, and as we briefly touched upon in the previous section, phenomenologists deny that empathy is a question of ascribing mental states to the Other through some abstract cognitive operations. Quite to the contrary, to be empathically acquainted with the Other involves a direct and immediate experience of the Other's experiential life (ibid., 150). According to the phenomenological proposal, it is through empathy that we experience the embodied mind of the Other in a way that does not eliminate the distinction between self and Other. In fact, according to the phenomenological approach, this asymmetry is considered a constitutive and necessary fact (ibid., 151). It is important to stress that this does not mean that empathy is something primitive in the sense of being unanalyzable (Zahavi 2012: 234).

On this note, I will now turn to Husserl's account of empathy, but I will confine myself to the problem of how we experience others and (mostly) leave the transcendental interests aside.

Husserl's Account of Empathy

According to Husserl, an experience of the Other as a minded creature is in some sense quasi-perceptual in nature, as the experiencer somehow grasps the Other in the experience of her body:

Ich sehe nicht nur seinen Körper, sondern ich erfahre dabei seine Körperlichkeit, seine Stellung, die seiner Augen, das Mienenspiel des Gesichts etc., ich erfahre den körperlichen Ausdruck als Ausdruck von einem Seelischen, ich erfahre das Körperliche als bedeutsam und in seiner psychischen Bedeutung. (Husserl, 1973: 83 f.)³⁰.

However, despite the fact that the body of the Other is intuitively given to the observer in an unmediated and direct way, the experiences of the Other are not given in their original presence. In other words, the experiences of the Other are not accessible to the experiencer in the same manner as her own experiences. That is, they are not accessible through inner consciousness; we do not have first-person access to said experiences. They are, however, appresented through a certain kind of apperception, i.e. they are co-intended and hence characterized by a certain type of co-presence. Accordingly, the perception of the bodily expressions of the Other is the foundation for the empathic co-perception that, in a unique fashion, represents e.g. the anger or pain of the Other (Zahavi, 2012: 227 ff.).

Consequently, empathy must be distinguished from both self-perception and external object-perception in the sense that it must be said to have its own kind of originality, fulfillment, and corroboration, and its own criteria for success and failure. For example, the possibility of the absent and appresented profiles of a given object in object-perception to

³⁰ Oversættelse: "Not onely do I see his body, rather I experience thereby his Körperlichkeit, his Stellung, die seiner Augen, das Mienenspeil des Geshichts etc., I experience his körperlichen Ausdruck as an Ausdruck from einem Seelischen, I experience das Körperliche as important and in a psychological Bedeutung". (TIDskrift-redaktionens egen oversættelse).

become intuitively given to me by the execution of certain required movements, say when I turn my computer around and look at its backside, is not present in terms of the Other's experiences. No matter what movements I carry out, the experiences of the Other will never be intuitively given to me in their original presence (ibid., 230 ff.).

This is not to say, however, that we cannot have a direct experience of another's psychological states. The experience of the Other's psychological states is the experience of her intentional and expressive behavior. Accordingly, even though we do not have first-person access to the experiences of the Other and therefore can be mistaken or deceived about what psychological states are being expressed, that does not amount to an imperfection or shortcoming (ibid., 232). On the contrary, this difference or asymmetry in experiential access is, according to Husserl, constitutional:

Erfahrung ist Originalbewußtsein, und in der Tat sagen wir im Falle der Erfahrung von einem andern Menschen allgemein, der Andere stehe selbst 'leibhaftig' vor uns da. Andererseits hindert diese Leibhaftigkeit nicht, daß wir ohne weiteres zugestehen, daß dabei eigentlich nicht das andere Ich selbst, nicht seine Erlebnisse, seine Erscheinungen selbst, nichts von dem, was seinem Eigenwesen selbst angehört, zu ursprünglicher Gegebenheit komme. Wäre das der Fall, wäre das Eigenwesentliche des Anderen in direkter Weise zugänglich, so wäre es bloß Moment meines Eigenwesens, und schließlich er selbst und ich einerlei. (Husserl, 1950: 139)³¹.

Accordingly, this very asymmetry in experiential difference is that which renders it possible to claim that the mind we experience is that of an Other.

³¹ "Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the other is himself there before us "in person". On the other hand, this being there in person does not keep us from admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same." Husserl, 1960: 108 ff.

As the quote states, if I had had the same experiential access to the consciousness of the Other as to my own, then the Other would no longer be an Other but become part of me, whereby the difference between self and other would cease to be.

According to Husserl, empathy is an intentional achievement and in analyzing the possibility of this intentional achievement he brings forth the concepts of *analogische Apperzeption* and *Paarung* (Zahavi, 2012: 235/Husserl, 1950: 138 ff.). The notion of *analogische Apperzeption* points to the fact that the Other appears as an animate organism or a minded being on the basis of some sort of bodily similarity (Husserl, 1950: 140). That is, the empathic experience of the Other somehow presupposes a similarity, i.e. analogical apperception is founded on some sort of similarity: “Es ist vor vornherein klar, daß nur eine innerhalb meiner Primordialsphäre jenen Körper dort mit meinem Körper verbindende Ähnlichkeit das Motivationsfundament für die ‘analogisierende’ Auffassung des ersteren als anderer Leib angeben kann” (ibid., 140)³². *Paarung* relates to the establishment of a phenomenal unity and in relation to the experience of another ego, the sense of being an animate organism stems from the sense of one’s own being an animate organism:

In dem uns besonders angehenden Fall der Assoziation und Apperzeption des *Alter ego* durch das Ego kommt es erst zur Paarung, wenn der Andere in mein Wahrnehmungsfeld tritt. Ich als primordiales psychophysisches Ich bin beständig abgehoben in meinem primordialen Wahrnehmungsfeld, ob ich auf mich achte und mich irgendwelcher Aktivität zuwende oder nicht [...] Tritt nun ein Körper in meiner primordialen Sphäre abgehoben auf, der dem meinen ‘ähnlich’ ist, d.h. so beschaffen ist, daß er mit dem meinen eine phänomenale Paarung eingehen muß, so scheint nun ohne weiteres klar, daß

³² “It is clear from the very beginning that only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the ‘analogizing’ apprehension of that body as another animate organism.” Husserl, 1960: 111

er in der Sinnesüberschiebung alsbald den Sinn Leib von dem meinen her übernehmen muß.(ibid., 143)³³.

In other words, by means of these two concepts, the Other gains the sense of being an animate organism. However, it is important to notice that these concepts do not involve any kind of inference. That is, they do not amount to a deliberate act of thinking or the like (ibid., 141). Rather, they point to the fact that past experiences influence subsequent experiences and consequently establishes a phenomenal unity:

Jede Apperzeption, in der wir vorgegebene Gegenstände, etwa die vorgegebene Alltagswelt ohne weiteres auffassen und gewahrend erfassen, mit einem Blick ihren Sinn mit seinen Horizonten verstehen, weist intentional auf eine 'Urstiftung' zurück, in der sich ein Gegenstand ähnlichen Sinnes erstmalig konstituiert hatte. [...] Wir haben dergleichen, obschon gerade nicht dieses Ding hier, früher schon gesehen. So birgt jede Alltagserfahrung eine analogisierende Übertragung eines ursprünglich gestifteten gegenständlichen Sinnes auf den neuen Fall, in seiner antizipierenden Auffassung des Gegenstandes als den ähnlichen Sinnes. (ibid., 141)³⁴.

33 "In that case of association and apperception which particularly interests us – namely apperception of the alter ego by the ego – pairing first comes about when the Other enters my field of perception. I, as the primordial psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay attention to myself and turn toward myself with some activity or other [...] Now in case there presents itself, as outstanding in my primordial sphere, a body 'similar' to mine – that is to say, a body with determinations such that it must enter into a phenomenal pairing with mine – it seems clear without more ado that, with the transfer of sense, this body must forthwith appropriate from mine the sense: animate organism." Husserl, 1960: 113.

34 "Every apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, and noticeably grasp, objects given beforehand – for example, the already-given everyday world – every apperception in which we understand their sense and its horizons forthwith, points back to a 'primal instituting', in which an object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time [...] Thus each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense." Husserl, 1960: 111.

Accordingly, when I experience a given object for the first time and come to understand its function, e.g. a pair of scissors, the next time I experience a pair of scissors I will immediately grasp their function even though this apprehending of the scissors is achieved without making any inferences or explicitly thinking about the original experience of the scissors (Ibid., 141). I am apprehending the new encounter with an associative reference to the original scissors, and this reference is passively established. So, in terms of empathy, when I encounter the Other my prior self-experience functions “[...] as a reservoir of meaning that is transferred onto the other in a purely passive manner.” (Zahavi, 2012: 235).

It is very important to notice that, according to Husserl, the ego refers to alter-ego and vice-versa. In the following, I will elaborate upon this point by explicating how I deem it questionable that the notion of empathy, as presented in embodied simulation and Husserlian phenomenology, respectively, is compatible.

In this respect, I will unpack Husserl’s account of empathy in more detail by relying on Zahavi’s interpretation hereof, and in the view of this I will point out two reasons as to why Gallese’s claim of an alleged compatibility between embodied simulation and phenomenology is questionable. Firstly, embodied simulation theory annuls the true transcendence of the Other. Secondly, embodied simulation theory does not seem to be able to account for the way in which the empathic encounter with the Other alters one’s own self-experience.

Embodied Simulation and Phenomenology: Compatible?

As mentioned above, the direction of the transfer of meaning in encountering the Other is not unidirectional. On the contrary, when encountering the Other I am not merely drawing on knowledge of my own case in coming to understand the Other, but this encounter also modifies my own self-experience.

The transfer of meaning in encountering the Other is, in other words, bidirectional, i.e. it is reciprocal in the sense that it is a mutual transfer of sense (Zahavi, 2012: 236). It is, however, important to notice that when we are encountering the Other we are not reproducing or reduplicating ourselves – when I experience a certain psychological state of the Other, my own experience of this psychological state is not functioning as an analogue for the state of the Other. Rather, to have an empathic experience of the Other that implies a mutual transfer of meaning requires some sort of self-givenness. Not in the sense of being the foundation for an active comparison between self and Other, but rather in the sense that it is my own bodily self-experience that constitutes a foundation for the perception of embodied others in the first place. This is not meant in the temporal sense of necessarily having to be before the given experience, but the experience of other subjects is in a general sense conditioned by my own bodily self-experience (ibid., 237 ff.).

One way to understand this is through the unique interplay between ipseity and alterity that Husserl terms “Doppelempfindung” or double-sensation. The curious nature of the subject-object status of the body is that when I am touching my hand it provides me with an experience of the dual nature of the body: the very same hand can appear as being touched and touching in a reversible manner. In other words, the same hand can appear in two fashions: as switching between being touched and touching. That is to say, the interiority and the exteriority are different manifestations of the same. This seems to be what Husserl is getting at when claiming that bodily self-givenness or self-exploration is the precondition for empathy (Zahavi 2001: 161).

This reciprocal and simultaneous transfer of meaning suggests that any account of empathy (or social understanding) that involves a kind of projection, in the sense that I only find in the Other what I have put there myself, fails to account for the true otherness of the Other. In other words,

that it fails to acknowledge the importance of the true transcendence of the Other that we, according to Husserl, encounter in empathy, i.e. where consciousness transcends itself and encounters Otherness of a completely different kind. This is partly due to the fact that a result of the *Paarung*, and hence the mutual transfer of sense, is the possession of experiences that one would not have had otherwise (Zahavi 2014: 133). Further, as seen previously, Husserl insists that empathy is not a kind of reproduction of oneself.

I believe that the above-mentioned points challenge the claim that Gallese's notion of embodied simulation and phenomenology provide compatible accounts of empathy. Firstly, if the understanding of the Other is dependent upon a form of internal simulation (be it reuse, reproduction etc.), then the experience of the Other seems to rely upon a projection of what I know of my own (simulated) case onto the Other, which (in some sense) annuls the true transcendence of the Other. For example, Husserl explicitly denies that in order for me to understand that the Other is angry, I myself must be experiencing anger (Zahavi 2014: 134). This does not seem to accord well with an explication of empathy and social understanding which is based upon an, albeit pre-reflexive, inner simulation founded on mirror matching mechanisms.

Secondly, it is not clear how a projective account of empathy, by way of mirror matching mechanisms, accounts for the reciprocal and simultaneous transfer of meaning between ego and alter ego. In other words, if my self-experience is modified by the very encounter with the Other, and vice-versa, how do we then account for this when the very understanding of the Other is a projection of an inner simulation? How are we to understand that what I myself project onto the Other simultaneously modifies my own self-experience? If my understanding of the Other is based upon my own act of inner simulation followed by a projection onto the Other, then it seems without any merit to result in me coming to possess

experiences that I would be incapable of having on my own. I, therefore, find it hard to see how such an account of empathy as inner simulation could be in accordance with Husserl's phenomenological account of empathy, and his notion of a mutual transfer of meaning where the alterity of the Other appears to play such a pivotal role.

The Transcendence of the Other: Problems with Husserl's Own Account?

One can voice the concern as to whether Husserl's own account of empathy really is well-equipped to account for the true transcendence of the Other. Does the focus on analogy as playing a fundamental role in empathy not complicate this picture? Does the Other really remain truly other in terms of *analogische Apperzeption* and *Paarung*? One might question whether any account of empathy, that in some sense relies on analogy, implies a reduction of the Other to the Self.

However, I do believe that Husserl's account of empathy has some merits in this regard. As we saw earlier, one can take Husserl to be saying that the condition of possibility for the experience of the Other as Other is self-experience. In other words, self-experience is a necessary condition for Other-experience. On this reading, the self-experience is not considered a model for Other-experience – it is not a question of projecting oneself into the Other – but the appearance of the Other as Other is conditioned by my self-experience in the sense that the Other appears to me in relation to and in contrast to this very self-experience (Zahavi 2014: 137). I consider such an interpretation to bear merits since the alterity of the Other is preserved. I am not projecting anything onto the Other. Rather, it is a transcendental argument to the effect that Other-experience is conditioned by self-experience in the first place. In other words, I am not reducing the psychological life of the Other to my own inner simulations.

Further, we saw that Husserl explicates this self-experience as a *Doppelempfindung*. The fact that my body is given for me, both as a physical body and a lived body, renders it possible for me to empathize with other similarly constituted bodies. However, it does not necessarily have to be a similar visual experience that plays the pivotal role in pairing. It might be the reciprocity and complementarity between one's own intentional behavior and expressive movements, and those found in the Other (ibid., 136). As Smith also points out, the core of empathy might have to do with attunement to the responsiveness of the Other in the sense that the Other responds to one's actions in a way that inanimate objects do not (Smith 2003: 243, 248/Zahavi 2014: 136). Further, Husserl operates with different levels of empathy and even though he would claim that the first level of empathy is constituted by *Paarung* this is only considered to be a primitive level, which by no means is exhaustive of the notion of empathy or social understanding – the full range of interpersonal understanding is much more complex.

Accordingly, the Other is ordinarily not thematized as an object in empathy but is rather given as a center of orientation that impacts the way in which my world appears to me (Zahavi 2014: 138 ff.).

Conclusion

In this paper, I have put forth an argument that questions the alleged compatibility between the account of empathy in Gallese's theory of embodied simulation and Husserl's phenomenological account. More specifically, the embodied simulation theory implies a simulation-projection theory of empathy, which renders it incompatible with the phenomenological account.

Based on the line of argument pursued in this paper, this is mainly due to the fact that it cannot account for the "true transcendence" of the Other, which Husserl repeatedly insists on. Further, the structure of the embodied

simulation theory complicates any accordance with the notion of mutual transfer of sense, which the concepts of *analogische*, *Apperzeption*, and *Paarung* seem to stress. Moreover, the importance of this mutual transfer of sense seems to rely on respect for the transcendence of the Other. The experiences that I come to possess through this pairing are experiences that I otherwise would not have had. I believe to have shown that the simulation-projection structure of the embodied simulation theory renders it unable to account for this aspect.

Finally, I have considered whether Husserl's own account of empathy is well equipped to account for the transcendence of the Other. I have put forth some considerations, partly based on his transcendental considerations regarding the conditions of possibility for Other-experience, which I believe to support his account of empathy in this regard.

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